Ukraine’s recent signing of the EU Association Agreement had all the hallmarks of a great political triumph—from President Petro Poroshenko’s “Slava Ukrayini!” (Glory to Ukraine) on Twitter, to the bouts of anthem-singing in Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, every impression that Ukraine had finally prevailed in its year-long political crisis was given. In reality, however, a beleaguered Rada had signed a bill hours earlier capitulating to most of Russia’s demands.
A striking example of taking the rough with the smooth, this bill granted pro-Russian (and Russian-sponsored) fighters in Ukraine’s eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk amnesty and self-rule for a period of three years. Unlike the seizure of Crimea in March, these territories will not be formally enveloped into the Russian Federation, but are no less valuable. While Crimea furnished Russia with a casus belli for serious intervention, should its status be violently challenged, the creation of a ‘frozen conflict’—not dissimilar to those in Russia’s other, smaller neighbours—gives Moscow unparalleled influence over Ukraine’s sovereign and domestic affairs.
The seizure of Crimea rectified a long-standing dispute between Ukraine and Russia: the costly stationing of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory, and soothed any fears of this Russian security architecture ever falling into NATO’s hands, were Ukraine to one day join. The acquiescence to the Russian-sponsored rebels in the east goes one further, and the leverage it provides is already evident.
The Association Agreement might have been signed, but Russian interference has already ensured that Ukraine’s free trade aspect will be delayed by 14 months, and that Ukraine will not sign any document that might preclude its further integration with Russia’s rival to the EU, the Eurasian Economic Union. It is unlikely that Ukraine will ever join the EEU, but this is largely the point. Since any attempt to alter the quick-setting status quo would likely prompt a resumption of hostilities—a thawing of the ‘frozen conflict’—Ukraine’s neutrality in the long-term is now guaranteed.
This is a conclusion in which the West is complicit. For all the verbal support and encouragement lent Ukraine by Western pundits and policy-makers alike, it is worth remembering their habit of being prodigal with words yet frugal with actions. A bonus to Russia throughout this crisis has been its exploitation of this tendency, once again framing Western states and institutions as toothless.
Meanwhile, Russia’s alliance-building (the USSR’s greatest weakness) prospers, as those uncomfortable with American global hegemony—among them the world’s two largest populations—quietly congratulate Russia, recognise its interests in Ukraine, and (in the case of China) even help shield it from Western sanctions. A West being quickly re-acquainted with the nature of international relations, has only the option of getting serious in both its rhetoric and its resolve.
CC image courtesy of US State Department, Wikimedia.
sinkingark
September 22, 2014
It’s pretty shocking to me how shitty American leaders have turned out to be right now at foreign policy decisions. I think you made a good point here:
“A West being quickly re-acquainted with the nature of international relations, has only the option of getting serious in both its rhetoric and its resolve.”
We’re not going to be able to put all the force in all the places we want all the time, but we do need to start thinking in realistic terms. If we keep basing foreign policy off of uncalculated idealism we’re just going to get fucked.
Matt Finucane
September 22, 2014
Quite right, the last four words were the big ones, and I’d have liked to have gone a bit deeper but this was written for print publication originally so word count was pretty strict.
I think if you look at how each and every Western Ukrainian action was enthused about and encouraged, its down-sides (like the inclusion of *some* neo-Nazis in the earlier coalitions) entirely whitewashed, this was always going to have an effect. It removed Yanukovich, which really set Russia in action, and pressed for further force to be applied in the East, when no Western assistance would be forthcoming.
Here the option really was to either curb the rhetoric to only what the West is realistically willing to do—I’m not saying surrender democracy’s virtues or anything, but make it clear that we’re not going to lend a hand—or to intervene in some serious way and risk sparking a third world war. Russia seriously cares about Ukraine, not just because it’s a cultural heartland etc. but because it has no natural borders on its western side, and with NATO coming ever closer would quite like to preserve the one it still has—whether it joins the EU or EEU is more or less irrelevant, when compared to the security implications.